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We describe recent advances in the empirical analysis of insurance markets. This new research proposes
ways to estimate individual demand for insurance and the relationship between prices and insurer costs
in the presence of adverse and advantageous selection. We discuss how these models permit the measurement
of welfare distortions arising from asymmetric information and the welfare consequences of potential
government policy responses. We also discuss some challenges in modeling imperfect competition
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Since the seminal theoretical work of Arrow (1963), Akerlof (1970), and Rothschild & Stiglitz
(1976), economists have been acutely aware of the potential for market failures arising from
asymmetric information in private insurance markets. The possibility that competitive forces
may not push toward e¢ ciency in a large and important class of markets creates interesting
and di¢ cult economic and policy issues. It also poses a challenge for empirical research: to
identify and quantify the e⁄ects of asymmetric information, and trace out its implications
for welfare, competition, and government policy.
From relatively modest beginnings, research in this direction has advanced rapidly over
the last decade, beginning with theoretically-motivated attempts to test whether asymmetric
information actually exists in particular insurance markets, and if so, in what form. This
work owes much to the e⁄orts of Chiappori & Salanie (2000, 2003), who described a set
of ￿positive correlation￿ tests for asymmetric information. The basic idea is to compare
claims rates for consumers who self-selected into di⁄erent insurance contracts.1 A ￿nding
that consumers who selected more insurance coverage have higher claim rates, conditional on
all information available to insurers, suggests asymmetric information: either consumers had
prior information about their exposure risk (adverse selection) or else purchasers of greater
coverage took less care (moral hazard).2
While tests for asymmetric information provide valuable descriptive information about
the workings of an insurance market, they have some important limitations. Notably, without
a clearly speci￿ed model of consumer preferences, they are relatively uninformative about
market e¢ ciency or about the welfare impact of potential market interventions (Einav et al.
2007). This has motivated recent work to move beyond testing for asymmetric information by
building empirical models that incorporate theoretically grounded speci￿cations of consumer
preferences. These models can be used to quantify the welfare distortions arising from
asymmetric information and the potential impact of government policies such as mandates,
pricing restrictions, and taxes. This more structured approach takes its cues from descriptive
1See for instance, Puelz & Snow (1994), Cawley & Philippson (1999), Cardon & Hendel (2001), Finkelstein
& Poterba (2004), Cohen (2005), and Finkelstein & McGarry (2006).
2Consumers with more coverage may also be more likely to ￿le a claim for any given loss, a phenomenon
sometimes called ￿ex post moral hazard.￿
1￿ndings in the testing literature, in particular by seeking to incorporate rich heterogeneity
in consumer preferences as well as the heterogeneity in risk emphasized in classic theoretical
contributions.
We describe this recent generation of models in Section 4, after setting out the standard
theory of insurance in Section 2 and brie￿ y reviewing the testing literature on comparative
claims analysis in Section 3. We focus on two alternative approaches, both of which combine
models predicting consumer choice and subsequent claims behavior. The ￿rst type of model
builds directly on the underlying theory of expected utility and attempts to map insurance
demand back to speci￿c parameters describing individual risk exposure, risk preferences, be-
quest motives, liquidity, and so forth. The second type of model sticks closer to traditional
discrete choice analysis by directly specifying consumers￿value for particular insurance con-
tracts as a function of consumer and contract characteristics. This higher-level approach
requires a weaker set of assumptions about exactly why and how consumers derive value
from insurance, but it limits the researcher￿ s ability to recover certain parameters, such as
the distribution of consumer risk aversion, that may be of intrinsic interest or could allow
for more radical extrapolation from the observed data.
This di⁄erence notwithstanding, both empirical approaches provide an econometric frame-
work for evaluating market e¢ ciency and examining the welfare consequences of certain types
of government policy. We elaborate on this point in Section 5, describing an empirical ap-
proach to welfare analysis and discussing some recent attempts to apply it in the context of
health insurance and annuity markets. A surprisingly common ￿nding of this research is that
even in those markets where there appears to be substantial evidence of adverse selection,
the welfare costs from misallocation appears to be relatively limited. We o⁄er one potential
explanation, which is that current work has considered only a limited type of distortions:
those arising from the mispricing of existing contracts, rather than ine¢ ciencies from cer-
tain types of coverage not being o⁄ered at all. The latter type of analysis appears to raise
new challenges of both a conceptual and applied nature, and we consider it an important
direction for further work.
The research we describe has focused on insurance demand and contracting under asym-
metric information, with less attention to the nature of insurer competition or to other
2sources of market frictions. We devote the ￿nal section of the paper to these issues, fo-
cusing on promising areas for future research. Chief among these are empirical analyses
of imperfect competition that take up the incentives of insurers in terms of pricing, plan
design, and information acquisition in the underwriting process. We also discuss a variety
of market frictions that seem particularly relevant for welfare and policy analyses. These
include competitive underwriting and ￿lemon dropping,￿trade-o⁄s between static and dy-
namic e¢ ciency in insurance markets, and models of consumer behavior that incorporate
search frictions or deviations from expected utility maximization.
A central theme of this review, and in our view a particularly attractive feature of the
research we describe, is the close connection between the underlying theory of asymmetric
information and the empirical modeling. Both the initial questions posed by the testing lit-
erature and the more recent approaches we discuss have been strongly motivated and guided
by the seminal theoretical works on asymmetric information in insurance. At the same time,
the ￿ndings from recent empirical work ￿in particular the quantitative importance of multi-
dimensional heterogeneity in preferences as well as risk type ￿have suggested the importance
of re￿nements both to the empirical modeling and to the theory. Insurance markets provide
a natural environment for testing, applying, and re￿ning information economics. This is in
part because the contracting problems are often relatively structured and also because the
underwriting and claims process generates comprehensive individual-level data. Most of the
empirical papers we describe take advantage of both these features.3
We should emphasize at the outset that this paper is not a comprehensive literature
review. We focus on a subset of questions that have motivated recent research and a subset
of contributions that illustrate particular empirical strategies. Our own papers get probably
more attention than they deserve. We only touch on, and do not do justice to, a number of
important issues including moral hazard in insurance utilization, dynamic aspects of insur-
3Of course researchers sometimes have access to individual-level choice data in more ￿standard￿product
markets, but the value is sometimes less pronounced. It may be reasonable to assume, for instance, that
consumers shopping for cereal in a grocery store aisle share the same choice set. But in insurance markets,
contract terms and prices are often highly customized and this can complicate inference if individual choice
sets are not observed. For example, if one observed high risk individuals having more limited coverage,
it would be hard to know if this was caused by demand (high risk individuals choosing less coverage) or
supply (high risk individuals being o⁄ered less coverage). This type of concern therefore puts at a particular
premium individual-level data in which researchers can observe the individual-speci￿c choice set.
3ance provision such as experience rating, and many issues relating to imperfect competition
that come up in the ￿nal section.
2. THEORY OF INSURANCE
2.1 The Canonical Insurance Model
We start by describing our basic model of insurance coverage and consumer choice that
we use throughout the paper. Suppose that a consumer can be described by a vector of
characteristics ￿ that embodies risk characteristics, preferences, income and so forth. Later,
it will be useful to separate these characteristics into those that are readily observable,
denoted x, and those that are not, denoted ￿. Similarly, we describe an insurance contract
by a vector of coverage characteristics ￿ and a price or premium p.
A consumer￿ s value for insurance and the insurer￿ s cost of coverage are determined by
events during the coverage period. Let A denote the actions available to the consumer during
the coverage period and S the set of possible outcomes. For example, a 2 A might represent
the level of care in driving and s 2 S whether or not the consumer has an accident. More
generally, ￿ling a claim might be part of the outcome, so that consumer￿ s behavior would
encompass both the level of care and the decision to ￿le a claim conditional on an accident.
To formulate this in a general way, we allow the probability of a given outcome to depend
on both the consumer￿ s behavior and his or her risk characteristics. Let ￿ (sja;￿) denote the
probability of outcome s. The consumer￿ s utility depends on what happens and his or her
coverage; we let u(s;a;￿;￿;p) denote the consumer￿ s realized utility.
With this notation, and adopting a standard expected utility framework,4 the consumer￿ s
valuation of a contract (￿;p) is:





It is useful to let a￿ (￿;￿;p) denote the consumer￿ s optimal behavior given coverage (￿;p),
4Expected utility strikes us as the natural starting point for modeling, but the empirical approaches we
describe could employ alternative models of choice under uncertainty such as those with probability weighting
or loss aversion with respect to a reference point. We view this as a very interesting avenue for future work.
4and ￿￿ (￿j￿;p;￿) = ￿ (￿ja￿ (￿;￿;p);￿) the resulting vector of outcome probabilities.
Most of the work we discuss below, and therefore the subsequent discussion in the rest
of the paper, imposes the assumption that the premium enters separably in the consumer￿ s
contract valuation. In the textbook case of expected utility over wealth this separability
assumption is equivalent to a constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) assumption. While
in principle one could work with any other form of risk preferences, the separable case is
attractive for two related reasons. First, it implies that changes in the premium do not a⁄ect
consumer behavior a￿ or the outcome probabilities ￿￿. Second, it makes for a natural choice
of social welfare function that is invariant to transfers and redistribution. We return to this
later in the paper.
We now can describe insurer costs. During the coverage period, the insurer makes pay-
ments depending on the outcome s and the coverage ￿. Let ￿(s;￿) denote these insurer






where we have imposed the premium separability assumption mentioned above. The cost
formula highlights an essential feature of selection markets, namely that unit costs depend
on the composition of consumers (i.e. enrollee characteristics ￿) rather than just the quantity
of consumers.5
Finally we introduce consumer choice by considering a set of insurance contracts J, with
each contract described by a pair (￿j;pj). A consumer with characteristics ￿ ￿nds contract
j 2 J optimal if and only if
v(￿j;pj;￿) ￿ v(￿k;pk;￿) for all k 2 J. (3)
This brings us to the usual starting point for a discrete choice demand model. One point
to emphasize is that although we have derived expressions for costs and contract valuation
5Equation (2) denotes the expected costs to the insurer in terms of claims paid. The insurer may also
have administrative costs per-enrollee or per-claim which could be easily modeled, although reliable data on
such costs may be more di¢ cult to obtain.
5from an underlying model of coverage, knowledge of the primitives ￿;u;S and A is actually
not required to resolve many questions of interest. To describe consumer demand for a
given set of products, or characterize consumer and producer surplus, or analyze optimal
pricing, knowledge of v and c is su¢ cient. Of course, we may still be interested in the
primitive parameters in order to understand exactly why consumers value insurance: due to
risk preferences or risk exposure or other factors. A related point pertains to insurer costs.
The cost function c expresses costs as a function of consumer and contract characteristics;
the more primitive model provides a way to understand, for instance, whether costs are
driven primarily by intrinsic risks or by behavior that can be in￿ uenced by incentives.
2.2 Selection E⁄ects and Moral Hazard
To establish a common vocabulary, we brie￿ y de￿ne adverse selection and moral hazard in
the context of the above model. Adverse selection in insurance markets is commonly used as
shorthand for a situation where high-risk individuals self-select into more generous coverage.
This is the phenomenon captured in the classic models of Akerlof (1970) and Rothschild
& Stiglitz (1976). For empirical work, however, patterns of risk selection often are less
straightforward. Market outcomes may not lead to clear sorting, as in the case where some
low-risk individuals are also highly risk-averse. Consumers may face varying types of risks:
for instance, some individuals may have a small chance of a large loss as opposed to a larger
chance of modest loss. And insurers o⁄ering plans with di⁄erent types of coverage may not
have identical views on the desirability of di⁄erent consumers.
It is useful therefore to have a de￿nition of adverse selection that applies in settings
beyond those where individuals are ordered by a single-dimensional risk characteristic. One
such de￿nition views a contract as adversely selected if it attracts a relatively unfavorable
set of customers. To formalize this, consider a set of consumers I selecting from the same
set of contracts J. Let I(j) denote the set of consumers who choose contract j. Contract j


















6It is advantageously selected if the reverse inequality holds. In other words, contract j is
adversely selected if the expected cost of insuring j￿ s enrollees under contract j is greater
than the expected cost of insuring the population I under contract j.6
Although this paper will focus mainly on selection, let us brie￿ y discuss moral hazard.
The basic problem of moral hazard is that insured consumers do not internalize all the costs
associated with risky behavior or utilization of covered services, i.e. optimal behavior (in
equation (1)) is chosen without regard for the insurer￿ s cost of making the claims payments
￿(s;￿). As consumer behavior may vary with the terms of coverage ￿, the di⁄erence in costs
associated with two alternative contracts ￿ and ￿
0 can be quite subtle. The contracts may not
only specify di⁄erent contingent payments, they may also result in di⁄erent outcomes (i.e.
by changing a￿ and hence ￿￿). One example is a health insurance plan with large copayments
or a restrictive network that induces di⁄erent utilization than a straight indemnity plan.
3. TESTING FOR ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
Recent empirical advances in insurance markets began with the development of ￿reduced
form￿tests for the existence of asymmetric information. The idea of these tests is to compare
claim rates for groups of individuals who have self-selected into di⁄erent insurance contracts,
typically more and less generous policies. To implement the test, we assume the researcher
has access to some outcome variable y, such as the number of accidents by insured drivers
or the mortality rate of annuity purchasers.
Given data on individuals who had the option to choose either contract j or some alter-
native contract k (perhaps no insurance at all), we can ask whether
E[yiji 2 I(j)] > E[yiji 2 I(k)]; (5)
6This de￿nition views adverse selection as a market outcome, and hence dependent on the set of contracts
o⁄ered and their prices. By this de￿nition, a contract o⁄ering intermediate coverage could be adversely
selected if the competing contracts o⁄ered little coverage, but the adverse selection might disappear if
there was a government mandate to o⁄er at least the intermediate level. Moreover, note that if costs are
minimized by matching consumers with speci￿c contracts ￿ as might be the case if di⁄erent consumers
respond to di⁄erent contract incentives ￿ one could have a market where every insurer views its selection
as advantageous (or adverse, for that matter).
7i.e. whether the expected outcome of consumers who chose contract j is greater than for
consumers who chose k. Generally, both sides of the inequality can be directly estimated from
the data. A positive ￿nding provides evidence of sorting, with riskier types self-selecting into
contract j, or incentive e⁄ects, with individuals behaving di⁄erently under the two contracts.7
Chiappori & Salanie (2000) emphasize that this approach requires some re￿nement be-
cause it does not clearly di⁄erentiate, as economic theories do, between individual char-
acteristics that are observable and those that are not. They propose to test whether the
inequality (5) holds conditional on characteristics x that are observed by insurers. That is,
they propose to test whether
E[yiji 2 I(j);xi = x] > E[yiji 2 I(k);xi = x]: (6)
Now, a positive ￿nding can be interpreted as evidence of asymmetric information: enrollees
in contract j have worse outcomes than enrollees in k for reasons that cannot be ascribed to
observable characteristics.8
Note that the set of conditioning variables is essential to the interpretation. For instance,
in many insurance markets certain characteristics can be observed but are not used in pric-
ing due to regulation or insurer decisions (for instance, race and gender, or in markets with
community rating, essentially all x￿ s). If the goal is to identify a true asymmetry of informa-
tion between ￿rms and consumers, one should presumably condition on these variables. But
from a theoretical perspective there is not much di⁄erence between a risk characteristic that
￿rms cannot observe and one they can observe but must ignore. So one may be interested
in a version of inequality (6) that does not condition on variables that insurers observe but
do not price (Finkelstein & Poterba 2006). A related, and important, point is that what
7Variants of this idea have been around for many years. For instance, Glied (2000) and Cutler & Zeck-
hauser (2000) summarize attempts to identify risk-based sorting in health insurance choice, where yi is
typically not an outcome but a particular individual characteristic thought to be associated with higher
claims, such as age or chronic illness. Note that the test is cleanest if all consumers choosing between j and
k faced the same prices. If they faced di⁄erent prices, it is necessary to control for price so as not to confuse
self-selection across contracts with di⁄erent risks having di⁄erent incentives in their choice of contract.
8Chiappori & Salanie (2000) emphasize that a main issue in implementing the conditional inequality
test is to control ￿ exibly for observed characteristics ￿ for instance, they suggest that a linear (or probit)
regression of y on a linear index of x￿ s and a contract dummy may not be su¢ ciently ￿ exible. Dionne et al.
(1997) suggest that a failure to account ￿ exibly for observable characteristics can lead to spurious results;
they ask whether this might be the case for the particular speci￿cation adopted by Puelz & Snow (1994).
8is ￿observable￿to insurers is often endogenous due to the ability to conduct more or less
scrutiny in underwriting.
The last point may help to explain the sometimes surprising results that have been
obtained in implementing comparative claims tests. Results have been mixed, with some
papers ￿nding no evidence of asymmetric information in particular markets (e.g. Cawley
& Philipson (1999), Chiappori & Salanie (2000), and Cardon & Hendel (2001)) and others
￿nding evidence of asymmetric information in particular markets (e.g. Finkelstein & Poterba
(2004), Cohen (2005), and He (forthcoming)).9 In comparing these studies, and others in
the same vein, a recurring theme is the extent to which measurable risk is priced in the
underwriting process. For example, prices of auto and life insurance policies are highly
tailored to re￿ ect risk, while there is little risk-adjusting of prices in the UK annuity market.
The comparative claims tests do not distinguish between risk-based selection (a contract
having riskier enrollees) and moral hazard (a contract inducing riskier behavior). To see
why, consider the decomposition:



















The ￿rst term is the e⁄ect of risk-based selection ￿ the di⁄erence in expected outcomes
between j and k enrollees under contract j. The second term is the e⁄ect of changing
coverage for a ￿xed population (in this case, those selecting k). We note that the order of
the decomposition can matter if there is heterogeneity in the response to coverage.
For certain insurance products, say annuities, it may be reasonable to assume that
changes in coverage do not induce large behavioral e⁄ects. In other cases where there may
be some concern, it still may be possible to isolate certain outcomes that are relatively im-
mune to incentives. For instance, researchers have focused on auto accidents that involve
two or more drivers, so as to avoid discretionary decisions about ￿ling a claim on a single-car
accident. More generally, and particularly for products such as health insurance, incentives
9For more detailed literature reviews see Chiappori and Salanie (2003) or Cutler et al. (2008).
9for covered consumers are harder to ignore. There may be no easy way to separately isolate
selection from incentive e⁄ects unless one has experimental or quasi-experimental variation
that moves consumers across contracts without directly a⁄ecting their behavior.10 Cardon
& Hendel (2001) is one of the ￿rst studies that entertained such variation. Assuming that
the employment relationship is exogenous to employer-provided bene￿ts, Cardon and Hendel
used the variation in the health insurance options o⁄ered by di⁄erent employers to separate
selection from moral hazard.
A further point about testing for asymmetric information is that even with a clear set of
conditioning variables and no moral hazard e⁄ects, di⁄erences in comparative claims rates
can be challenging to interpret. Consider a ￿nding that there is no di⁄erence between
purchasers and non-purchasers of insurance. This could suggest that private information
about risk is not a factor in consumer choices, or that sorting based on private information
about risk is o⁄set by some other dimension of unobserved heterogeneity, such as di⁄erences
in risk aversion.11 Finkelstein & McGarry (2006) provide a striking example of o⁄setting
self-selection in the market for long-term care insurance. By exploiting auxiliary survey
data, they show that individuals possess private information about their likelihood of using
long-term care but that lower-risk individuals are also more risk-averse, so that on average
they are equally likely to buy insurance as higher risk individuals. Fang et al. (2008)
similarly document multiple dimensions of private information in the US Medigap market.
Their ￿ndings suggest that di⁄erences in cognition, rather than in risk aversion, may be an
important dimension of heterogeneity a⁄ecting consumer choices and ultimately leading to
advantageous selection of Medigap coverage.
These latter papers illustrate an important practical point: di⁄erences among purchasers
of insurance go well beyond the di⁄erences in risk assumed in textbook models. This obser-
10This is really just the familiar econometric problem of selection and treatment. In health insurance, the
Rand Health Experiment is a gold standard in its use of random assignment to di⁄erent coverages, but one
can also hope for naturally occurring variation. Exogenous variation in premiums (as in Einav et al. 2008a)
provides one possibility so long as premiums per se do not a⁄ect behavior. Panel data is another alternative
and is explored by Abbring et al. (2003a, 2003b). The same problem of separating selection and moral
hazard arises in other contracting settings, and there has been some recent progress particularly in credit
markets (Adams et al. 2009; Karlan & Zinman 2009).
11The idea that di⁄erences in risk-seeking attitudes could lead some individuals to purchase insurance
while taking few risks, and that this could o⁄set standard adverse selection e⁄ects, dates back at least to
Hemenway (1990).
10vation has a variety of implications. For instance, in textbook models of insurance market
failure, a full-insurance mandate is often welfare-enhancing. But this conclusion easily can
be reversed in a model where consumers di⁄er in preferences as well as risk exposure. An
attractive feature of the models in the next section is that they allow the data to dictate
which dimensions of consumer heterogeneity are important, and can be used to illustrate
how di⁄erent types of heterogeneity a⁄ect welfare or policy assessments.
4. EMPIRICAL MODELS OF INSURANCE DEMAND
We now turn to more recent work that seeks to estimate empirical versions of the insurance
contracting model described in Section 2. This more recent work builds on, and comple-
ments, the insights obtained in the testing literature, particularly regarding the rich nature
of consumer heterogeneity and the value of combining choice data with ex post claims behav-
ior. That being said, there are several reasons to go beyond testing toward more structured
empirical models.
One primary motivation, and a standard one for demand analysis, is to use estimates
of demand and costs to analyze market e¢ ciency, and the e⁄ects of market interventions.
Without strong additional assumptions, a ￿nding from the ￿testing literature￿of asymmet-
ric information is insu¢ cient for even qualitative statements about the e¢ ciency costs of
asymemtric information (Einav et al., 2007). At the very least, welfare analysis requires a
model of consumer preferences and the e⁄ect of consumer choices on insurer costs. Moreover,
the interdependence of demand (self-selection) and costs, and the possibility that consumers
have private information relevant for insurer costs, calls for a joint model of consumer de-
mand and insurer cost. In the same way that claims di⁄erentials are taken as evidence of
private information in the testing literature, ex-post cost realizations can be used to proxy
for information consumers ￿might have had￿in self-selecting.
A second motivation for modeling consumer demand is to understand in more detail what
determines the willingness to pay for insurance in a given population. For instance, one may
like to know whether individuals di⁄er mainly in their underlying risk, in their behavioral
response to coverage, or simply in their tastes for being insured. Optimal policy and contract
11design may be very di⁄erent depending on the answer to this question. Related to this, and
a motivation that is perhaps most distinct from more traditional demand analysis, is the
desire to estimate aspects of consumer preferences, for example risk aversion, that might be
generalized to other contexts. Information from relatively simple choices under uncertainty,
e.g. the choice of deductible in auto or homeowner insurance, can be useful in this regard.
In considering applications that pursue these objectives, we ￿nd it useful to distinguish
two classes of empirical models. The ￿rst approach builds directly on the model of expected
utility described in Section 2, with the goal of recovering consumers￿realized utility over
wealth. The second approach follows more closely traditional discrete choice demand analy-
sis, attempting only to recover the distribution of consumer contract valuations v (as opposed
to the realized utility u) over di⁄erent insurance products or product characteristics. Both
approaches also lead to estimates of claims rates and how they covary with consumer pref-
erences. Moreover, both approaches recover the essential information to analyze consumer
surplus or explore the implications of many policy interventions. The ￿rst class of models
imposes stronger assumptions in its reliance on the underlying theory, but also allows for
more ambitious extrapolation using theory as a guide, and provides the ability to estimate
parameters, such as those governing risk aversion, that may be of inherent interest. We
discuss the trade-o⁄s further as we go.
4.1 Modeling Realized Utility
We begin by describing empirical models that build directly on the framework described in
Section 2 to estimate a realized utility function ui for each consumer. We illustrate this
approach using the work of Cohen & Einav (2007). Cohen & Einav attempt to estimate the
distribution of risk aversion using coverage choices made by customers of an Israeli auto-
mobile insurance company. Individuals in their data faced a choice between two alternative
deductible levels with di⁄erent attached premiums. Each individual i chose between a high-
deductible contract with price and (per claim) deductible of pi;HD and di;HD, respectively,
and a low deductible contract, (pi;LD;di;LD).
Cohen & Einav assume that claims arrive according to a Poisson process that is not
a⁄ected by the choice of deductible ￿ i.e. there is no ￿incentive e⁄ect￿on driving or claims
12behavior from a change in coverage. Combining this with an assumption of CARA utility
over wealth,12 we can write the expected utility from a contract ￿ = (p;d) over a short time
period t as follows:
vi(p;d;wi;"i; i) = (1 ￿ "it)ui(wi ￿ pt) + ("it)ui(wi ￿ pt ￿ d): (8)
Here "i is the individual￿ s Poisson risk rate, wi is his wealth, and ui(x) = ￿exp(￿ ix), with
 i denoting the coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion. With CARA preferences, the consumer￿ s
wealth does not a⁄ect his or her insurance choices, so the relevant consumer characteristics
(￿ in our notation of Section 2) are the predictable risk " and risk aversion  . The main
object of empirical interest is the joint distribution G("; ) in the sample.
Cohen & Einav show that this model leads to a simple approximation of the optimal
deductible choice. The low deductible contract is preferred to the high deductible contract
if and only if
"i >
 i (pi;LD ￿ pi;HD)
exp( idi;HD) ￿ exp( idi;LD)
: (9)
Naturally higher risk aversion and higher risk both make greater coverage (a lower de-
ductible) more attractive. So one can envision choice behavior by thinking of individuals
as distributed in ("; ) space, and the space divided so that individuals with relatively high
levels of   (risk aversion) and/or " (risk) prefer the low deductible. (Figure 2 in Cohen &
Einav (2007) provides exactly this graphical presentation.)
An essential feature for identi￿cation and estimation, and especially to separate whether
willingness to pay is driven by   or ", is the ability to use claims data (or more generally
￿outcome￿data). Intuitively, the ex post information about claims provides a proxy for the
private information about risk (") that consumers ￿might have had￿at the time of purchase.
In the setting of Cohen & Einav, employing the claims data requires a modeling assumption
about the possible information possessed by consumers at the time of purchase. They as-
sume that consumers know exactly their individual-speci￿c Poisson claim rate, and combine
this with the convenient assumption that individual Poisson parameters and coe¢ cients of
12We note that the baseline model of Cohen & Einav (2007) is of quadratic utility, which carries certain
computational advantages. But in order to be consistent with the price separability we use throughout this
paper, we illustrate the same ideas in the context of CARA utility.
13absolute risk aversion are jointly log-normally distributed in the population. These assump-
tions allow them to map from claims realizations back to the marginal distribution of Poisson
parameters, and from there to use the choice data to recover the marginal distribution of
the coe¢ ceint of absolute risk aversion and its correlation with risk.
The joint distribution of risk and risk preference reported by Cohen & Einav has some
interesting features. They ￿nd that individuals appear on average to exhibit a relatively
high degree of risk aversion in making their deductible choices, although there is also a high
degree of dispersion. They also ￿nd a positive correlation between risk and risk aversion,
so that risk preferences tend to reinforce the tendency of high-risk individuals to purchase
more coverage.
Finally, the model generates estimates of the incremental cost (to the insurer) associated
with selling individual i a low deductible contract. Speci￿cally:
c(di;LD;"i) ￿ c(di;HD;"i) = "i ￿ (di;HD ￿ di;LD); (10)
so the cost di⁄erential depends on the claims rate "i, but not on the risk aversion parameter
 i.
Cohen & Einav do not pursue the welfare implications of their model, but this is the
impetus for the related paper by Einav et al. (2009). Einav et al. apply a similar empirical
strategy to estimate the joint distribution of risk type and consumer preferences in the UK
annuity market. In their case, the relevant preference variation is not in risk aversion, but
in the preference for wealth after death (perhaps due to a bequest motive). They ￿nd that
all else equal, consumers who have higher mortality rates (and are therefore associated with
lower costs to the annuity provider) have a stronger preference for wealth after death. In
this context, the preference for wealth after death reinforces the demand of high mortality
individuals for annuities with a guaranteed minimum payout, increasing the extent of adverse
selection along this contract dimension. We discuss their use of these estimates for welfare
analysis in Section 5.
The Cohen & Einav (2007) and Einav et al. (2009) papers help illustrate the comple-
mentarity between tests for asymmetric information and more complete models of insurance
14demand and claims. Cohen & Einav build on earlier work by Cohen (2005), who uses a
comparison of claims rates to identify a strong element of adverse selection in the underlying
data. Similarly, Einav et al. (2009) are motivated by earlier work of Finkelstein & Poterba
(2004, 2006), who found evidence of adverse selection using claims data from the UK annuity
market. In both cases, the ￿reduced form￿comparative claims tests provide robust empirical
￿ndings for the existence of adverse selection without the need to invoke assumptions on the
form of the utility function or the exact information structure. The more tightly speci￿ed
models impose these assumptions but then can provide quantitative evidence on the relative
contribution of risk and preferences in determining choices. And as we emphasize below,
they provide a quantitative framework for welfare and policy analysis.
An earlier and pioneering paper in this general line of research is Cardon & Hendel￿ s
(2001) study of health insurance demand, which we mentioned in Section 3. Cardon &
Hendel￿ s analysis allows not just for private information about risk (selection) but also for
discretionary utilization (moral hazard).13 They assume consumers have homogenous risk
preferences but allow them to di⁄er in underlying risk and in their ￿tastes￿ for di⁄erent
health plans. In contrast to the above papers, however, they ￿nd little evidence that private
information about risk drives consumer choices. Although their primary objective was to
test for adverse selection, the model they develop is also well-suited to welfare analysis or
counterfactual exercises.
4.2 Modeling Valuation of Insurance Contracts
The applications above began with a primitive model of how consumers derive value from
insurance. For many questions of interest, however, particularly those related to pricing or
to welfare analysis of contracts similar to those observed in the data, a useful alternative is
to begin directly with a model of contract valuation v.
The idea can be illustrated using the Cohen & Einav example. Their model gives
rise to a speci￿c functional form for v, with parameters that can be interpreted as risk
and risk aversion. However, if they were solely interested in the value of having the lower
deductible, and the relationship between this value and a consumer￿ s risk, a natural way
13A very similar demand model has been used subsequently by Bajari et al. (2006).
15to proceed could have been to specify vi as a ￿ exible function of price and deductible, e.g.
v(pi;LD;di;LD;￿i) = f (di;LD;di;HD;￿i) ￿ (pi;LD ￿ pi;HD), and to use the variation in prices or
in deductibles to estimate the distribution of the random coe¢ cient ￿i, interacting ￿i with
the realized claims to obtain a model for costs.
Roughly speaking, this is the approach taken by Bundorf et al. (2008) to analyze pricing
and welfare in health insurance. Bundorf et al. use data from a health insurance intermediary
to analyze the welfare implications associated with o⁄ering employees choice between HMO
and PPO coverages. Because the data come froman intermediary, the authors take advantage
of the fact that the same underlying health insurance plans are o⁄ered to employees at
di⁄erent ￿rms with substantial cross-￿rm price variation (and some modest variations in
coverage terms). The goal of the paper is to estimate demand and claims behavior in order
to assess the welfare consequences of alternative pricing policies and the degree to which risk
adjustment improves allocative e¢ ciency. Like the papers described above, the authors ￿nd
that accounting for consumer heterogeneity in both risk and preferences is important.
Bundorf et al. model consumer i￿ s valuation of contract j by
v(￿j;pj;(zi;ri;"i;(￿ij)) = ￿j￿￿ + zi￿z;j + f(ri + "i;￿r;j) ￿ ￿ppj + ￿ij; (11)
where the ￿￿ s are coe¢ cients to be estimated, individual observed characteristics are given by
the vector of demographics zi and a risk score ri, and individual unobserved characteristics
are given by unobserved risk type "i and an i.i.d logit error term for each plan ￿ij. The former
can be thought of as the ex ante information an employee has regarding his subsequent health
utilization (in addition to the predictable portion given by ri), while the latter can be thought
of as plan preferences that are orthogonal to underlying risk.
This demand model closely resembles familiar models of discrete choice. Without the two
middle terms ￿zi￿z;j + f(ri + "i;￿r;j) ￿it reduces to a standard multinomial logit demand
model. The additional terms essentially add a plan ￿xed e⁄ect with random coe¢ cients.
Here, the random coe¢ cients vary with individual demographics (zi) and risk score (ri), as
well as with an unobserved component ("i). Unlike the typical random coe¢ cient formula-
tion, however, here the unobserved component is not free, but is restricted by its correlation
16with an outcome variable, insurer costs.14 The model captures selection by the additional






= aj + bj(ri + "i); (12)
with the same "i entering both the plan choice equation and the insurer￿ s cost.
The availability of an observed risk score, which is assigned to each household by the
intermediary based on demographics and drug prescriptions, and the assumption that an
unobservable individual risk type enters the model in the same way as the observed risk
score, help identify the model. Loosely, the coe¢ cients bj and ￿r;j are identi￿ed by having
rj as a shifter, thus leaving any residual correlation between choices and subsequent costs to
identify the importance of risk unobservables "i.
There are several related papers that model consumer valuations over di⁄erent health
plans. Carlin & Town (2007) and Lustig (2008) pursue approaches that are similar in spirit
to Bundorf et al., although tailored in various ways to their speci￿c data and application.
A variant of this approach models contract valuations in product space rather than charac-
teristic space. For instance, Einav et al. (2008a) use data from a single large employer to
estimate demand over health insurance options. Rather than modeling contract valuation
as a function of plan and individual characteristics, they simply trace out the distribution
of willingness to pay for incremental health coverage, and the average cost of covering con-
sumers with each level of willingness to pay, using the observed price variation in their data.
Relative to modeling contract valuation over characteristic space, their approach imposes
even less structure though it further narrows the types of welfare questions that can be
answered (as we discuss in more detail in Section 5).
It is also informative to contrast the contract valuation modeling approach taken by
papers like Bundorf et al.￿ s with the more complete models in papers such as Cohen &
Einav￿ s. The former captures the fact that di⁄erent plans are more or less attractive to
higher risks through the interaction of risk scores and plan ￿xed e⁄ects (by letting ￿r;j vary
14Bundorf et al. (2008) do not observe individual-level outcomes (costs). Rather, they observe costs at
the employer level and aggregate their model predictions about outcomes to the aggregation level provided
by the data.
17with j). Presumably, a more complete model would provide more guidance as to how plan
characteristics (￿j) interact with risk, but for the purpose of Bundorf et al. ￿estimating the
welfare consequences of alternative pricing regimes ￿approximating the contract valuation
by interacting plan ￿xed e⁄ects and risk is su¢ cient.
More generally, the trade-o⁄ between these two broad approaches is a familiar one. The
more primitive approach involves an extra layer of modeling assumptions, including the
underlying distribution of risk type, the ex ante information set of the consumer, a model
of moral hazard, and an underlying decision-theoretic framework.15 In return, it provides
additional guidance about the appropriate functional form for contract valuation, and allows
for a broader set of counterfactual predictions: for instance, predictions about choices over
insurance products that are simply not observed in the data (e.g., a cap on coverage in the
Cohen & Einav application). Moreover, certain estimated parameters, such as the coe¢ cient
of risk aversion, may be of independent interest.
5. WELFARE COST OF ASYMMETRIC INFORMA-
TION
The models of insurance contracting described in the previous section provide a useful frame-
work for analyzing welfare distortions. As is well understood, asymmetric information can
generate at least two barriers to e¢ cient insurance arrangements. The ￿rst is moral hazard
during the coverage period. To provide incentives for precaution and utilization, insureds
may need to bear some risk and resources may be required to monitor behavior.16 The sec-
ond is self-selection in the choice of insurance coverage. If individuals are privately informed
about their risk, market prices are unlikely to incorporate the relevant information necessary
to achieve allocative e¢ ciency.
Recent work has used the modeling approaches described earlier to make progress on
15The latter, in particular, is often a questionable assumption, with prominent researchers arguing for
some form of mistakes in coverage choices (Heiss et al. 2007; Abaluck & Gruber 2009).
16We would put the type of copayments and utilization reviews that are typical in health insurance into
this category. It is also common to see insurance restricted so as not to create perverse incentives. For
example, insurance companies typically do not allow homeowners to insure their home for more than its
market value even if the consumer feels that this is unlikely to fully compensate for a loss.
18quantifying these types of welfare losses, focusing on the problem of self-selection. Some of
this work has also examined the welfare consequences of potential government interventions
aimed at ameliorating the welfare losses due to self-selection. We start this section by more
precisely de￿ning what we mean by welfare, and highlighting the well known ine¢ ciencies
associated with competitive provision of insurance when consumers have private information
about their risk. We then discuss recent approaches to quantifying the ine¢ ciency of observed
prices as well as the welfare implications of alternative government interventions.
The results from this recent literature are in some ways surprising, in that in several set-
tings researchers have not found large ine¢ ciencies attributable to asymmetric information.
As we discuss below, this may be in part due to the research focus on consumers choosing
among a limited set of coverage options o⁄ered in the market, rather than on whether changes
in the characteristics of o⁄ered insurance could signi￿cantly enhance e¢ ciency. This is a po-
tentially critical omission and likely biases downward ￿perhaps by a substantial margin ￿
the existing estimates of the welfare cost of adverse selection.
5.1 Measuring Welfare
We start by using our theoretical framework to construct a welfare metric that can be
used to compare alternative allocations. To do this, we again focus on the case where each
consumer￿ s value for insurance is quasi-linear in the premium.17 Then we can write the value
of an individual with characteristics ￿ who obtains coverage ￿ at a price of p as:
v(￿;p;￿) = ~ v(￿;￿) ￿ p: (13)
If we further normalize the value from having no coverage to be zero, ~ v(￿;￿) is the monetary
value of coverage ￿. Letting c(￿;￿) denote the cost of providing coverage ￿ for a consumer
with characteristics ￿ (equation (2)), the net surplus created by the coverage is ~ v(￿;￿) ￿
c(￿;￿).
17As we will see, the quasi-linear assumption leads conveniently to a welfare analysis based on total surplus.
For certain policy debates related to insurance, however, distributional e⁄ects are likely to be of ￿rst order
importance. In these cases, it may be desirable to incorporate income e⁄ects or adopt a social welfare
function that prioritizes distributional objectives. The empirical framework we have described also can be
applied to these settings; see for example Einav et al. (2009).
19To move from individual to market welfare, suppose that we have a population of con-
sumers and that each consumer obtains coverage ￿ = ￿(￿) according to his characteristics
￿. We refer to ￿(￿) as a coverage allocation, that is, a function that maps individuals into
contracts. Of course the nature of the coverage allocation is likely to depend on the set of
contracts o⁄ered, the degree of price competition among insurers, market regulation, and so
forth, but we can put that aside for the purpose of de￿ning welfare.
We say that a coverage allocation ￿ generates (per-person) surplus equal to
W (￿) =
Z
f~ v (￿(￿);￿) ￿ c(￿(￿);￿)gdG(￿); (14)
where G is the distribution of consumer characteristics in the market.
At least conceptually, the information needed to compute W (￿) can be obtained directly
from the empirical models described above. These models provide empirical analogues of ~ v
and c, along with estimates of how consumer characteristics are distributed in the population
(G) ￿ precisely the inputs for calculating welfare. In practice, one serious constraint is that
a limited set of coverage options are likely to be observed in the data so that obtaining
reliable estimates of ~ v and c may be possible only for a fairly narrow class of coverage terms
(i.e. ￿(￿) 2 ￿, and ￿ is a ￿small￿set). At least partially for this reason, the papers we
describe below primarily consider welfare analyses that leave ￿xed the set of coverage options
￿ and simply ask how di⁄erent pricing regimes a⁄ect e¢ ciency, rather than addressing the
welfare e⁄ects of changes in the underlying set of coverage options.
5.2 E¢ cient and Competitive Allocations
Most welfare analyses are concerned with the e¢ ciency of alternative coverage allocations ￿
observed allocations, or the allocations that would result from di⁄erent modes of competition
or market interventions ￿ relative to some e¢ cient or constrained e¢ cient benchmark.




~ v (￿;￿) ￿ c(￿;￿): (15)




h(￿;￿)dG(￿) ￿ W (￿): (16)
Note that in describing e¢ cient arrangements, two types of constraints may be relevant.
First, the set of feasible contracts ￿ may impose certain limitations. If the insurance company
cannot observe certain types of precautionary behavior, or the circumstances that led to
certain types of claims, e¢ cient contracting may be hampered by moral hazard. Historical,
legal, and regulatory factors can also limit the set of feasible contracts. Second, h(￿;￿)
provides a ￿perfect information￿benchmark for e¢ ciency (subject to any constraints on the
set of feasible contracts ￿) in the sense that individuals are assigned coverage based on all
relevant characteristics ￿. By comparing surplus (welfare) in the observed allocation ￿ to
that in the perfect information benchmark, equation (16) provides a metric of the welfare
loss associated with private information.
Of course, the observed allocation ￿ may also re￿ ect distortions other than imperfect
information, such as market power, frictions in consumer search, or various transaction
costs. A second natural benchmark for applied research is therefore to compare utility in the
￿perfect information￿benchmark to the allocation that would result from perfect competition
between insurers when individuals have private information. With asymmetric information,
competitive and e¢ cient allocations generally do not coincide. As with the case of e¢ cient
allocations, estimates of consumer demand and insurer costs are exactly what is required
to solve for the types of competitive equilibria described by Akerlof (1970), Rothschild &
Stiglitz (1976), Miyazaki (1977), or Wilson (1977).
A practical di¢ culty for empirical research is that except in relatively restrictive settings
solving for competitive equilibria, or even assuring that one exists, may be di¢ cult. One
case that permits a straightforward, but still interesting, analysis is where insurers compete
in price to o⁄er a single (exogenously ￿xed) type of coverage ￿. In this case, at a market
price p consumers with ~ v(￿;￿) ￿ p will purchase coverage, and the average cost of covering
these consumers will be AC (p) = E[c(￿;￿)j~ v (￿;￿) ￿ p]. Competitive equilibrium will occur
at a point where ￿rms make zero pro￿t, so that pc = AC (pc).
21In the textbook case of adverse selection, the most costly consumers are also most eager
to buy coverage, so the cost of covering the marginal purchaser at p, equal to MC(p) =
E[c(￿;￿)j~ v (￿;￿) = p], is strictly below the average cost. As a result, competitive equilibrium
is ine¢ cient. At the competitive price pc, there are a set of consumers who do not purchase
coverage but for whom their value ~ v(￿;￿) exceeds their cost of coverage c(￿;￿). Einav et
al. (2008a) provide a graphical analysis of this case that highlights the close connection to
standard supply and demand analysis. They observe that competitive equilibrium occurs at
the intersection of the demand and average cost curve, while the e¢ cient allocation occurs at
the intersection of the demand and marginal cost curves, so that the ine¢ ciency is captured
by a familiar ￿deadweight loss￿triangle.
The single contract case also provides a useful starting point for thinking about the type
of pricing necessary to implement e¢ cient allocations. Suppose for instance that individuals
vary in their risk " and risk aversion  , both of which a⁄ect willingness to pay. The full-
information e¢ cient allocation will assign coverage to an individual with characteristics ("; )
if and only if ~ v ("; ) ￿ c("). If prices are to induce e¢ cient self-selection, a single price p
may not su¢ ce. All individuals with the same ~ v("; ) will make the same purchase decision
but it may be ine¢ cient to cover those with high ", and therefore high c(").
This highlights another implication of richer consumer heterogeneity. In the Akerlof
setting where consumers are di⁄erentiated in a single risk dimension, setting p = MC(p) can
lead to e¢ cient self-selection if it separates individuals who are e¢ ciently covered from those
who are not. With richer heterogeneity, we may still be interested in the degree of e¢ ciency
that can be realized with a uniform price, but we may also want to understand how the
potential for e¢ cient coverage depends on the information available to set prices; Bundorf
et al. (2008) explore this set of issues. A related point applies to competitive pricing.
If insurers can observe information about individual risk " and price it, the welfare loss
associated with competitive pricing is sometimes reduced (although in general the welfare
e⁄ects are ambiguous ￿ see Levin, 2001).
225.3 Distortions in the Pricing of O⁄ered Contracts
We now turn to assessing the allocative ine¢ ciency associated with general pricing regimes.
To see the mechanics, consider a ￿xed set of coverage options, say ￿ and ￿
0 (e.g. a higher or
lower deductible, or a PPO or an HMO health insurance plan) and a pricing regime such that
an individual with characteristics ￿ faces prices p(￿;￿) and p(￿
0;￿) (that may partly re￿ ect
his characteristics). Recall that the empirical models above provide estimates of consumer
utility ~ v (￿;￿), insurer costs c(￿;￿), and the distribution of consumer types G(￿). Under the
candidate pricing regime, a consumer with characteristics ￿ will select coverage ￿ if and only
if
~ v (￿;￿) ￿ ~ v (￿
0;￿) ￿ p(￿;￿) ￿ p(￿
0;￿): (17)
So by combining choice behavior with the welfare formula in (16) above, one can use the
model to map directly from a pricing regime to the resulting coverage allocation to welfare.18
Cutler & Reber (1998), Carlin & Town (2007), Bundorf et al. (2008), and Einav et
al. (2008a) all follow this approach to analyze the e¢ ciency of alternative allocations in
employer sponsored health insurance.19 Einav et al. (2008a) focus on the di⁄erence between
competitive and e¢ cient allocations. Speci￿cally, they consider a case where employees are
assigned to a default level of coverage and incremental coverage is priced competitively ￿ i.e.
according to the average cost of covering the individuals who select it. Because their estimates
imply that incremental coverage is adversely selected, the resulting allocation exhibits fewer
individuals opting for high coverage than if incremental coverage was priced to maximize
e¢ ciency. Interestingly, they ￿nd that the magnitude of the welfare loss resulting from
competitive allocation is quite small, in both absolute and relative terms.20
The setting in Bundorf et al. (2008) is a bit di⁄erent because the health plans in their
data are more richly di⁄erentiated: employees in their data choose between PPO and HMO
18Note that our quasi-linearity assumption renders the level of prices unimportant, making it natural to
focus on the incremental price of di⁄erent coverage options.
19Einav et al. (2009) analyze the welfare cost of asymmetric information in a very di⁄erent setting, the
UK annuity market. They also report a relatively small e¢ ciency loss relative to an e¢ cient assignment of
consumers to the o⁄ered types of annuity.
20Speci￿cally, Einav, Finkelstein, and Cullen estimate this welfare cost to be less than 10 dollars per
employee per year, and to be only about one-￿fth of the social cost required to achieve the e¢ cient allocation
through a government price subsidy.
23plans rather than more or less coverage. They estimate that the lowest cost plan in their
data (an integrated HMO) achieves most of its savings for predictably high-cost consumers.
These cost savings, however, cannot be passed on in a targeted way without risk-adjusting
prices, something employers are not barred from doing. Motivated by this, Bundorf et al.
investigate how much e¢ ciency can be achieved by setting prices conditional on varying
amounts of information, and how this compares to standard types of contribution policies
used by employers. They ￿nd that relative to any sort of feasible pricing policy, the losses
from observed contribution policies are in fact relatively small.
These papers are ￿rst cuts at addressing e¢ ciency issues in insurance markets, but they
illustrate how these types of questions might be addressed with the modeling approaches
we have described. The link with the testing approach also bears mention. In the settings
we have described, a descriptive analysis reveals patterns in insurer costs that suggest the
potential for large welfare distortions and guide the welfare questions being asked. The more
complete model allows for precision and quanti￿cation ￿ in these applications yielding the
perhaps surprising ￿nding of limited ine¢ ciencies. The interplay between the model and the
descriptive analysis of the data, however, is central.
5.4 Distortions in the Set of Contracts O⁄ered
The papers above take a relatively narrow (albeit practical) approach to measuring inef-
￿ciency by focusing on how market prices or various pricing interventions e¢ ciently sort
consumers into a ￿xed set of coverage options. A potentially more signi￿cant source of in-
e¢ ciency is that certain types of coverage are not o⁄ered due to concerns about extremely
adverse take-up. Government regulations mandating speci￿c components of coverage (such
as coverage for mental health or in vitro fertilization) are arguably a response to such prob-
lems.
Estimating the potential welfare gains from the introduction of coverage options not
observed in the data poses a series of additional challenges. One di¢ culty is that while
￿contract valuation￿demand models can allow for some extrapolation in predicting consumer
value for coverage options ￿close￿to those observed in the data, these models are not well-
suited for assessing the value of wholly new types of coverage. A more primitive model that
24speci￿es exactly how consumers derive value from insurance in principle can be used for
more dramatic extrapolation, but of course one may be concerned about how much relevant
information is really contained in the data. In practice, even papers with ￿rich enough￿
demand models (e.g., Einav et al. 2009) have shied away from analyzing the welfare e⁄ects
of novel coverage options, although Lustig (2008) is a notable exception.
A further challenge for welfare analysis of ￿non-o⁄ered￿contracts stems from modeling
competition between insurers. While analyzing price competition over a ￿xed set of coverage
o⁄erings, or analyzing competition in prices and coverage in a setting where insurers have
symmetric information to consumers, appear to be relatively manageable problems, char-
acterizing equilibria for a general model of competition in which consumers have multiple
dimensions of private information is another matter. Here it is likely that empirical work
would be aided by more theoretical progress.
An alternative approach to examining welfare losses from ￿non-o⁄ered￿contracts is to
identify cases where adverse selection has caused a previously available coverage option to
disappear. Cutler & Reber (1998), for instance, describe the case of an adverse selection
￿death spiral,￿where a particularly generous health insurance plan was initially propped
up by subsidized pricing and subsequently disappeared when the cross-subsidization was
removed. Pauly et al. (2004) describe a similar demise of a generous employer-sponsored
plan but argue against a death spiral interpretation. We view this as a potentially promising
approach to quantifying the welfare cost on this important margin, but of course it can only
be used if the policy was o⁄ered at some point in time.
The ￿lamppost￿problem of empirical work gravitating to markets where there are data
and dimensions of coverage along which there is observed variation may be one reason that
existing papers have found relatively small welfare losses. We are not aware, for instance,
of any empirical work that looks at the welfare cost of complete market failures of the
type described by Akerlof (1970).21 A few recent papers, including Hosseini (2008), Brown
& Finkelstein (2008a), and Mahoney (2009), have used calibration exercises to investigate
21There is some work looking at insurance market failures, notably for ￿catastrophic￿risks such as terror-
ism, hurricanes on the Gulf Coast, and earthquakes in California. Failures in these markets, however, appear
to have been caused by institutional failures not directly related to the type of asymmetric information we
have been discussing. We are also not aware of attempts to measure any welfare impacts in these markets.
25insurance markets that are virtually non-existent (U.S. annuities, long-term care insurance,
and ￿high deductible￿ health insurance, respectively). The approach in these papers is
quite complementary to the models in Section 4 in the sense that the calibrated models
require assumptions about the population distributions of speci￿c utility parameters, e.g.
characterizing risk aversion. Demand analysis for insurance products can in principle provide
useful input, although with natural caveats about making heroic extrapolations from the
models we have described.
5.5 Welfare Consequences of Government Policy
Adverse selection provides a textbook economic rationale for government intervention in
insurance markets. Such intervention is ubiquitous, occurring through coverage mandates,
restrictions on pricing and underwriting, tax subsidies to private insurance purchases, pru-
dential regulation of insurers, or in many cases direct government involvement as an insurance
provider. A natural question for empirical work, therefore, is to explore the welfare conse-
quences of these types of policies, and to try to identify settings in which government policies
might or might not be bene￿cial.22 In principle, the set of questions one might ask is large,
so we limit ourselves to a few policies that have received some empirical attention.
Mandates. The empirical analysis of the welfare consequences of mandatory insurance
provides an interesting example of the interaction between advances in empirical modeling
and the original underlying theory. Mandatory social insurance is the canonical solution to
the problem of adverse selection in insurance markets (Akerlof 1970). Yet as emphasized by
Feldstein (2005) and others, mandates are not necessarily welfare improving when individ-
uals di⁄er in their preferences. Instead, they may involve a trade-o⁄ between reducing the
allocative ine¢ ciency produced by adverse selection and increasing allocative ine¢ ciency by
eliminating self-selection. In light of this, evidence of preference heterogeneity (Finkelstein
& McGarry 2006; Cohen & Einav 2007; Fang et al. 2008) has important implications for
welfare analyses of mandates. For example, Einav et al. (2009) ￿nd that mandates have
ambiguous welfare consequences in an annuity market with risk and preference heterogeneity.
22Siegelman (2004) provides an interesting, and critical, discussion of how concerns about adverse selection
have shaped legal jurisprudence as well as public policy.
26Restrictions on Pricing Characteristics. Another common government intervention in
insurance markets is to restrict insurers￿ability to price on the basis of observable charac-
teristics such as gender, age, or other predictors of risks, partially as a way to circumvent
adverse selection, to shield consumers from reclassi￿cation risk, or as a way to redistribute. In
addition, ￿rms often appear to forego voluntarily the use of readily observable characteristics
that are correlated with expected claims, such as gender in the case of long term care insur-
ance (Brown & Finkelstein 2008b) or geographic location in the case of annuities (Finkelstein
& Poterba 2006).23 Several papers have evaluated the potential welfare consequences of such
restrictions. The Bundorf et al. (2008) and Einav et al. (2008a) papers described above ex-
amine the e¢ ciency and competitive consequences of characteristics-based pricing of health
plans. There are also a number of studies of the empirical e⁄ects of community rating, which
suggest the potential for interesting welfare analyses.24
Taxes and Subsidies. Empirical insights regarding the nature of consumer heterogeneity
are also relevant for tax policy in insurance markets. In classic models of adverse selection,
a government subsidy can e¢ ciently mitigate the ine¢ ciently low level of insurance coverage
provided in a competitive market. But this conclusion can be reversed if consumer hetero-
geneity creates the opposite type of advantageous selection, in which case taxation rather
than subsidies may be warranted (de Meza & Webb 2001). Einav et al. (2008a) provide an
illustrative calculation of tax policy to induce e¢ cient outcomes, noting that the theoretical
ambiguity created by the possibility of advantageous selection creates an opportunity for
new empirical analyses of optimal tax policy toward insurance.
6. COMPETITION AND MARKET FRICTIONS
Relative to the research described above, there has been much less progress on empirical
models of insurance market competition, or on empirical models of insurance contracting that
incorporate realistic market frictions. One challenge is to develop an appropriate conceptual
framework. Even in stylized models of insurance markets with asymmetric information,
23Finkelstein & Poterba (2006) discuss a variety of potential explanations ￿including perhaps most promis-
ingly the threat of regulation ￿for this ostensibly puzzling behavior.
24See, for instance, Buchmueller & Dinardo (2002) or Simon (2005).
27characterizing competitive equilibrium can be challenging and the challenge is compounded if
one wants to allow for realistic consumer heterogeneity and market imperfections. Moreover,
many of the micro-level datasets used in recent work come from a single insurer or from ￿rms
that o⁄er a menu of insurance plans to their employees. Ideally one would like somewhat
broader data to analyze market competition.
Despite these di¢ culties, we view competition and frictions in insurance markets as
an exciting direction for research. Health insurance markets, for example, exhibit high
concentration and some distinguished economists have argued that insurers tend to compete
along dimensions such as risk selection that are highly ine¢ cient.25 Increased access to
consumer information, particularly genetic and other health information, also raises novel
questions about competition in markets for life insurance, annuities, and other insurance
products. A more sophisticated view of competition also seems essential for analyzing the
types of welfare and policy questions discussed in the previous section, particularly if one
hopes to account for strategic behavior by insurers, or dynamic ine¢ ciencies. Concerns
about these factors frequently motivate public policy and insurance market regulation.
Given this motivation, we use the next two subsections to brie￿ y surface some promising
questions for future research. We start by discussing plan design and pricing under imperfect
competition, and then highlight a few types of market imperfections where there seems to
be promise for bringing together theory and data.
6.1 Pricing and Plan Design
Empirical demand models provide a natural starting point for analyzing the incentives of
imperfectly competitive insurers to set coverage options and prices. To illustrate, it is useful
to start with the case of a monopoly provider of insurance. Suppose the provider o⁄ers a
single contract, described by its coverage characteristics ￿ and premium p.
Normalizing consumer value from no coverage to zero, and assuming quasi-linearity in
the premium, a consumer with characteristics ￿ will purchase the contract if ~ v (￿;￿) ￿ p. So
25To quote Paul Krugman on health insurance: ￿the truth is that the notion of bene￿cial competition in
the insurance industry is all wrong in the ￿rst place: insurers mainly compete by engaging in ￿risk selection￿
￿ that is, the most successful companies are those that do the best job of denying coverage to those who
need it most,￿(Paul Krugman blog entry, June 22, 2009, at http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com).
28the share of consumers who purchase will be:
Q(￿;p) =
Z
1f~ v (￿;￿) ￿ pgdF(￿), (18)
and the insurer￿ s expected costs are:
C (￿;p) =
Z
1f~ v (￿;￿) ￿ pgc(￿;￿)dF(￿) (19)
The ￿rm￿ s problem is to choose contract terms to maximize expected pro￿t:
max
￿;p
￿(￿;p) = p ￿ Q(￿;p) ￿ C (￿;p): (20)






￿ (p ￿ E￿ [c(￿;￿)j~ v(￿;￿) = p]): (21)
The ￿rst term represents the additional revenue Q(p) from existing customers. The second
term captures the lost pro￿t on marginal consumers who now choose not to purchase.
Relative to the standard monopoly problem, the identity of the marginal consumer plays
a key role. If riskier consumers tend to have higher values for coverage (as in a standard
adverse selection setting), marginal consumers will be relatively attractive compared to the
average consumer, so there is in some sense an extra incentive to keep prices low. In general,
however, a ￿rm￿ s marginal consumers could be more or less desirable than the ￿rm￿ s average
customer, or the average customer in the market.
A similar analysis can be used to describe incentives for plan design, with the added
subtlety that changes in coverage may a⁄ect utilization as well as selection. For instance,
if ￿ denotes the fraction of losses that the insurer will reimburse, we can write the e⁄ect of










j~ v(￿;￿) ￿ p
￿
: (22)
O⁄ering more generous coverage therefore has three e⁄ects: it is likely to increase demand,
29it may alter the composition of purchasers (to the extent that marginal purchasers with ~ v = p
are di⁄erent than the existing customer base with ~ v ￿ p), and it is likely to increase costs for
the covered population ￿ potentially by inducing behavioral changes as well as mechanically.
So the optimal choice of coverage level may involve a consideration of both selection and
incentive e⁄ects on pro￿t margins, as well as the usual market share considerations.26
From an applied perspective, the types of demand models described in Section 4 provide
exactly the primitives needed to ￿￿ll in￿ equations (21) and (22), and examine provider
incentives to adjust premiums and coverage options. Moreover, at least in principle the same
approach can be taken to look at the bene￿ts of o⁄ering various menus of contracts, with
the added complication that one must consider substitution across contracts as premiums or
coverage levels are adjusted. While we are unaware of empirical papers that attempt even
the basic type of pricing analysis for insurance providers, Einav et al. (2008b) develop and
apply a related approach to study pricing of credit contracts.
A still more ambitious agenda is to extend the single-￿rm model above to characterize
Bertrand-Nash equilibrium outcomes with oligopolistic ￿rms. This raises both conceptual
and computational challenges. Conceptually, there is little reason to believe that even a game
in which ￿rms compete in prices alone will have the convexity properties typically invoked to
assure existence or to justify an analysis based on ￿rst order conditions for optimal pricing.
Moreover, even if an equilibrium does exist and even if it can be characterized in terms of ￿rst
order conditions, solving numerically for the equilibrium may be challenging. A recent paper
by Lustig (2008) makes a ￿rst attempt on this agenda, analyzing imperfect competition in
the market for Medicare HMOs (Medicare Part C).27
26While we have largely emphasized selection e⁄ects, there is a fairly substantial literature, particularly in
health insurance that attempts to measure the sensitivity of utilization to consumer prices or plan features
such as copayment levels. For one recent example, see lo Sasso et al. (2009).
27Lustig (2008) characterizes the available plans by their premium and their generosity index, and uses
variation in market structure (number of ￿rms) across geographical markets in the US to estimate demand.
Lacking cost data, he uses the ￿rst-order conditions for optimal pricing as moments in the estimation to
back out the implied adverse selection. With estimates in hand, he then runs counterfactual simulations in
which he allows plans to reset their equilibrium premiums and generosity index given various information
structures.
306.2 Other Aspects of Competition
The discussion above emphasized how one might study incentives for imperfectly competitive
pricing and plan design without speci￿c assumptions about the source of market power or
market frictions. Many interesting issues in insurance markets revolve around particular
types of market frictions and how they interact with competition.
Underwriting and Risk Selection. A common concern in insurance markets, and partic-
ularly in health insurance, is that insurers have an incentive to engage in risk selection or
￿lemon dropping,￿and this incentive may be heightened by competition. This possibility
raises two issues from a welfare perspective. First, costly e⁄orts by an insurer to identify and
avoid large risks may simply serve to shift costs onto other insurers (this is the rent-seeking
aspect of competition). Second, to the extent that all insurers invest to avoid bad risks,
an unregulated market may lead to less cross-subsidization in the risk pool than would be
optimal from a social perspective (this is the so-called ￿Hirshleifer e⁄ect,￿after Hirshleifer
1971). We are unaware of concerted empirical e⁄orts to assess the extent of risk selection or
its welfare impacts, but the types of cost and demand models we have described could be
applied fruitfully in this direction.
Dynamic Insurance Provision. The models we have described take a static view of the
insurance problem, but in practice individual risk evolves over time. An obvious example
is the cost of providing life or health insurance, which increases with age and the onset
of chronic health conditions. This evolution can create a tension between e¢ cient short-
term contracting and the provision of dynamic insurance. Static e¢ ciency may require that
consumers face prices that are actuarially fair, but the resulting price adjustment over time
creates a dynamic risk of being reclassi￿ed to steeper premiums, or perhaps even dropped
from coverage if there are further ine¢ ciencies in the market. Regulatory e⁄orts to ensure
insurance portability or guaranteed renewability attempt to combat the lack of dynamic
insurance created by competitive markets with short-term contracting, but we are not aware
of attempts to analyze these policies from a welfare perspective. Extending welfare and
policy analysis to examine the implications of short-term contracting, or partial long-term
commitments (Hendel & Lizzeri 2003), or quantifying inherent trade-o⁄s between static and
31dynamic e¢ ciency would be an interesting direction.
Consumer Search and Switching Costs. Many insurance products are purchased infre-
quently and can be complex to evaluate. In light of this, one expects that insurance market
competition may be limited by the partial information of consumers and their hesitancy to
switch away from a familiar product. The highly customized nature of insurance premiums
(and sometimes other contract terms) exacerbates this e⁄ect, making price comparison and
reliance on consumer reviews more di¢ cult. One indication of this is the price dispersion
commonly observed even in insurance markets where ￿rms appear to be o⁄ering very similar,
or even identical, coverage. Another indication are the very low price elasticities of demand
often reported in studies of employer-sponsored health insurance, suggesting that consumers
switch only reluctantly among plans. With appropriate modi￿cations, the demand models
we have described provide a potentially promising framework for addressing these issues and
their welfare consequences. One wonders, for instance, whether the amount of consumer
search or consumer interest in plan switching is systematically related to risk, and whether
this might a⁄ect competition. Another interesting set of questions concerns the changes
in consumer demand and competition spurred by increased access to information on the
internet (Brown & Goolsbee 2002).
Alternative Models of Consumer Behavior. Finally, and perhaps less directly related
to competition, are concerns about the behavior and sophistication of consumers. The
standard model of insurance assumes that risk preferences are well-captured by the expected
utility model, and empirical implementations tend to assume that individuals formulate their
probability assessments according to objective risk probabilities. Both assumptions can be
challenged. Cutler & Zeckhauser (2004), for instance, argue that certain puzzles about the
provision of insurance are hard to explain without alternative models of consumer decision-
making, such as those involving loss aversion, misapprehension of probabilities, or simply
confusion.28 In principle the modeling approaches we have described above could be adapted
to these alternative theories, with potentially new implications for insurer incentives and the
28See also Barseghyan et al. (2008) and Abaluck & Gruber (2009) who test (and reject) whether indivdiuals
appear to behave as rational expected utilty maximizers. Of course, such tests are really joint tests of the
behavioral model and all of the other assumptions needed to identify the model.
32role of competition. Of course welfare analysis becomes increasingly subtle as one moves
away from the conventional model and allows for the possibility of consumer mistakes.
7. CONCLUSIONS
For many years empirical methods lagged well behind the frontier of theoretical work on
asymmetric information. Now the gap is closing. We have described some recent advances
in building and estimating empirical models of insurance. Already these models have yielded
insights into the subtle nature of consumer heterogeneity and the possibility that certain
kinds of welfare losses from asymmetric information, at least in some insurance markets,
may be modest.
Many interesting questions remain, however. In addition to the topical questions de-
scribed above, the applications we have described have focused on a relatively narrow set of
insurance markets ￿health insurance, auto insurance, life insurance, and annuities ￿leaving
others to be explored. Largely untouched, for instance, are an important set of insurance
products where public provision or regulation has a strong presence. These include disability
insurance, unemployment insurance, and worker￿ s compensation. As adverse selection is a
standard economic rationale for intervention in these markets, it is unfortunate that we lack
convincing evidence on whether selection would exist in the private market, not to men-
tion its welfare consequences and the welfare e⁄ects of government intervention. Of course,
such work is made challenging by the current existence of the large public programs, but
nonetheless these are important and interesting issues to try to examine.
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